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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
---00000---

COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15499

s·rATE ROAD COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant and
Appellant.
---00000---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
---00000---

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an award of interest by the District
court on principal amounts determined to be due and owing
by appellent to respondent on three highway construction
contracts.

The determination of the principal amounts

owed was made through arbitration proceedings which reserved
the question of interest, as a question of law, for decision
by the District court.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment
seeking interest on principal amounts which were previously
determined to be due and owing to respondent in arbitration
proceedings.

The District court granted the motion and

entered partial summary judgment against appellant for
interest in the amount of $21,532.24.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the District
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in appellant's
Brief is incomplete and not sufficiently detailed or
precise to adequately and accurately present the questions
to be decided.

Therefore, respondent will state the facts.

For convenience, the parties will be referred to by the
trial court designations where appellant was defendant and
respondent was plaintiff.
Prior to January 29, 1971 plaintiff and defendant
entered into a number of contracts for the construction of
highways in various parts of the State of Utah.

(R. 269).

Plaintiff had filed suit against defendant in the Third

-2-
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Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake county, to
collect money it claimed was owed to it by defendant under
several of these contracts, including the contracts covering the three projects involved in this appeal.

{R. 269).

The three contracts involved here were designated as
Poison Springs Wash to Trachyte JUnction,

(herein called

Trachyte project); Hanksville to Poison Springs Wash,
(herein called Hanksville project); and Perry to three
miles west of Brigham city,

(herein called Brigham City

project).
Under the specifications covering the three contracts,
it was defendant's obligation to accurately measure all
quantities of work performed by plaintiff and to pay
plaintiff in full at the time defendant submitted the final
estimate invoices on each of the projects.

Section 1-9.1

of the specifications provided:
"Measurement of Quantities. All work completed
under the contract shall be measured by the Engineer
according to United States standard Measure."
(R. 264).
Section 1-9.8 of the specifications provided:
"Acceptance and Final Payment. When the final
inspection and final acceptance have been duly made,
a final estimate will be prepared by the Engineer,
based on the actual quantities of authorized work

-3-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

done under each item scheduled in the proposal •..
which estimate will show the total value of the
completed work and the final payment due the
contractor."
(R. 264).
In the complaint, plaintiff claimed that defendant failed
to correctly measure and pay for the work done by plaintiff.
(R. 269).

The Complaint also demanded payment of interest

on the principal amounts owing to plaintiff.
On January 29, 1971 plaintiff and defendant entered
into an Arbitration Agreement under the terms of which
the parties agreed to submit plaintiff's claims for quantities of work performed and money due for such work to an
arbitration panel.

(R. 269-273).

However, all questions

of law were reserved to be heard and decided by the Third
District court in paragraph Eighth of the Arbitration
Agreement, which provided, in part:
"Cox and Highway Department reserve all
questions of law to be heard by a District JUdge
of the Third JUdicial District in and for Salt
Lake County as part of said suit, Civil No.
177519. The rulings by said District JUdge on such
questions shall be binding on any award made by the
Arbitration Board, except that such decisions may
be appealed by either party hereto. Said questions
of law shall be heard by said District JUdge following
the arbitration hearings."
(R. 272).
Proceedings under the Arbitration Agreement commenced,
and after dealing with several claims on which liability
was admitted by defendant, or the claims dropped by plaintift
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and after extensive discovery proceedings and investigation and re-measurement of work at the project sites,
plaintiff and defendant were able to resolve most of
the factual issues between themselves regarding the
quantities of work done by plaintiff.

They entered into

agreements on the three projects setting forth the quantities of work done by plaintiff on each project for which
defendant would pay and the dollar amounts to be paid.
Defendant's brief erroneously implies that the claims
on the three contracts were settled by lump sum payments.
To ascertain the real nature of the settlements it is
necessary to examine in some detail plaintiff's claims
and the settlement agreements entered into, as well as
statements in the record by defendant's counsel as to what
matters were settled.

Each claim and each settlement will

be examined separately.
Claims Presented in Arbitration.
Brigham city project.

Plaintiff submitted a claim

for payment for specific quantities on 15 separate contract
items.

Included were claims for specific quantities of

work done at specific locations on the project site under
contract item 3, roadway excavation: contract items 34(I),
4l(I), 52(I) and 63(I), excavation for structures: contract
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items 26(F) and 3l(I), spreading topsoil; contract items
19(F) and 23(I), plant mix seal coat; contract item lO(I),
concrete pipe; contract items ll(F) and 12(I), steel pipe;
improperly assessed flagging charges; improperly assessed
penalty; and force account work for correction of an
elevation error.

(R. 323-325).

The claim on each of

these items represented a claim for a principal amount
owing under the contract.

In its response defendant replied

separately to each item on which claim had been made.
contract items 4l(I), 52(I), 63(I) and 34(I)

Under

(excavation

for structures), defendant admitted that it had not paid
for the wingwall excavation and that money was owed to
plaintiff for this excavation but the amount had not yet
been computed.

Under contract items 26(F) and 3l(I)

(spreading topsoil), defendant admitted it had made errors
in calculations and that it owed plaintiff $1,724.48,
representing 2,299.3 cubic yards at the contract unit price
of 75 cents per cubic yard.

On the claim for improper

flagging charges, defendant admitted that it had charged
plaintiff for railroad flagging charges incurred by defendant during the period of about two years before plaintiff's
contract commenced.

Defendant stated it would determine

-6-
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.....

the amount of the flagging charges improperly assessed
against plaintiff.

On the force account claim, defendant

admitted it owed plaintiff $571.00 on that item.

Defen-

dant denied liability on six items and stated it would
have to determine its liabiltiy on two other items.
(R. 323-325).

When the computations were made the amount

defendant admitted it owed was $19,395.43.
Hanksville project.

Plaintiff submitted a claim for

payment for specific quantities of work performed on 18
separate contract items.

Included in the claim on one

contract item, roadway excavation, was a breakdown on the
quantity of work done by plaintiff in fifteen separate
areas.

Also included were claims for specific work done

under contract item 5, mechanical tamping; contract item 6,
imported borrow; contract item 7, compaction; contract
item 8, class A overhaul; contract item 9, class B overhaul;
contract item 20, special pipe; contract item 27, untreated
base course; contract item 28, bituminous material; contract
item 33, small ditch excavation; contract item 34, loose
rip rap; force account work for refinishing slopes at five
locations; force account work for repairing an adjacent
roadway; and force account work for repairing a drainage
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area.

(R. 277-281).

The claim on each of these items

represented a claim for a principal amount due under the
contract.

In its response defendant answered the claims

on each of the contract items separately.
Trachyte project.

Plaintiff submitted a claim for

payment for specific quantities of work performed on
25 separate contract items.

On contract item 3, roadway

excavation, work done and not paid for in 19 separate
locations on the project was set forth in detail.

Also

included in detail were claims for specific work done under
contract item 5, mechanical tamping; contract item 6,
compaction; contract item 7, class A overhaul; contract
item 8, class B overhaul; contract items 10 and 12, metal
pipe; contract items 16, 17 and 19, structural pipe;
contract item 25, bituminous material; contract item 29,
small ditch excavation; contract item 30, loose rip rap;
and 11 different

items of force account work.

The claim

on each of these items represented a claim for a principal
amount due under the contract.

In its response defendant

replied to each of the separate items of the claim.
Following extensive discovery proceedings, plaintiff
and defendant reached agreement on the quantities of work

-8-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

done by plaintiff on most of the contract items involved.
settlement Agreements.
Brigham City project.

Under the stipulation settling

plaintiff's principal claims on this project, defendant
paid for 8,750 cubic yards of roadway excavation under
contract item 3 at the contract price of 40 cents per
cubic yard for payment of $3,500.00.

Under contract items

4l(I), 52(I), 63(I) and 34(I), excavation for structures,
defendant paid for 467.95 cubic yards at the contract price
of $3.00 per cubic yard for a payment of $1,403.85.

Under

contract items 26(F) and 3l(I), spreading topsoil, defendant
paid for 2,298.67 cubic yards at the contract price of 75
cents per cubic yard, making a payment of $1,724.00.
Plaintiff dismissed its claims under contract items 19(F),
23(I), lO(I), ll(F) and 12(I).

On the claim of improper

flagging charges, defendant paid $15,696.58 for flagging
charges improperly assessed against plaintiff.

On the

improper assessment of a penalty, defendant paid $2,413.29,
the full amount it had improperly assessed against plaintiff.
Defendant paid $571.00 on the force account item for correction of an elevation error.

On the claim on contract item

44, site grading, defendant paid $3,500.00 for work done
by plaintiff.

(R. 274-276).

The amount paid was the sum
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of the individual principal amounts owed and totaled
$28,808.72.

In its response to plaintiff's claim defendant

had originally admitted liability on eight of the 11 contract
items on which payment was finally made.

Payment on the

eight contract items admitted from the outset was $19, 395.91,
with $9,412.81 paid on contract items originally disputed.
(R. 323-325).
Hanksville project.

Under the stipulation settling

plaintiff's principal claims on this project, defendant
paid under contract item 3 for 13,327.4 cubic yards of
roadway excavation at the contract price of 28 cents per
cubic yard for a payment of $3,731.68.

Under contract

item 5, mechanical tamping, defendant paid for 184.6 hours
at the contract price of $5.45 per hour for a payment of
$1,006.07.

On contract item 6, imported borrow, defendant

paid for 2,619 cubic yards, which at the contract price
amounted to $1,833.30.

Payment made under contract item

7, compaction, was broken down into 5,833 cubic yards of
precompaction for $233.32 and 15,946.3 cubic yards of
compaction for $637.85.

Under contract item 33, small

ditch excavation, defendant paid for 923.5 cubic yards for
a payment of $1,385.26.

contract item 34 involved loose
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rip rap and defendant paid for 1,133.3 cubic yards for a
payment of $3,399.99.

Under the force account claim,

defendant paid for refinishing slopes at seven separate
locations with hourly rates for equipment and labor totaling $156.00 at the first location, $52.00 at the second
location, $100.00 at the third location, $75.00 at the
fourth location, $2,124.00 at the fifth location and
$400.00 at the sixth and seventh locations.

Also under

the force account claim defendant paid for three pieces
of equipment for varying lengths of time for blading an
adjacent road for a payment of $2,124.00.
Trachyte project.

(R. 277-281).

This agreement is reflected in a

letter from defendant's counsel to defendant.

(R. 315-319).

The letter sets forth the amounts to be paid on each item
of the claim.
items.

Payment was made under 17 different contract

Under contract item 3, roadway excavation, claim

was made for work in 19 separate areas.
for work in 18 of those areas.

Defendant paid

The following is an example

of how the letter spelled out the areas where payment was
due for roadway excavation:

-11-
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-AMOUNT CLAIMED IN
CONTRACTORS CLAIM

AMOUNT
REQUE§..!t

CONTRACT ITEM NO. 3
Area No. 1, Channel Change
125 feet left of station
1398+00

399 .49

399.49

Area No. 2, Channel Change
75 feet right of station
1122+00

1,963.62

1,963.62

Area NO. 3, Channel Change
125 feet left of station
1199+00

407 .40

147.45

* * * * *
(R. 315).
The total paid for work under contract item 3, roadway
excavation was $11,877.61.

On contract item 5, mechanical

tamping, defendant paid $329.73.

On contract item 6,

precompaction, defendant paid $191.92.

Defendant paid

$1,002.69 under contract item 25, bituminous material
RC70 and $404.25 on contract item 29, small ditch excavation.
On contract item 30, loose rip rap, defendant paid $1,704.96.
On nine separate claims for work under force account,
such as claims for cleanup of water damage, replacement of
pipe and blading another highway, defendant paid $932.00,
$167.75, $190.40, $1,334.12, $582.58, $105.45, $1,000.00,
$745.48 and $441.71, respectively.

(R. 315-318).
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In each settlement agreement the payment made by
defendant was for specific quantities of work done by
plaintiff on specific contract items, and the payments
represented principal amounts owing under the contract.
There was no lump sum settlement of plaintiff's claims.
On the question whether the settlements were intended
to include plaintiff's claim for interest, defendant's
lawyers each made a statement.

Mr. Strong, who negotiated

the settlement of the Hanksville and Trachyte claims,
said in his affidavit:
"4. Affiant further states that at the time
said stipulation was entered into, to wit, February
15, 1974, it was his understanding that the defendant
was not obligated to pay interest on unliquidated
claims and the subject of interest was not considered
by the parties for that reason. Affiant further
states that this understanding concerning interest
was obviously shared by plaintiff's counsel."
(Emphasis added).
(R. 314).
At the hearing on the Motion for Summary JUdgment, Mr.
Ford, who represented defendant in the settlement of the
Brigham city claim, admitted that the question of interest
was never considered by the parties in negotiating and
settling the claims.

(R.

334).

Plaintiff had demanded payment of interest in its
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complaint in the District court and in the Arbitration
Agreement it had reserved all questions of law for decision
by the District court.

As to when the questions of law

where to be presented to the District court, the Arbitration Agreement in Paragraph Eighth provided:
• said questions of law shall be heard by
said District JUdge following the arbitration hearings."
(Emphasis added).
(R. 272).
The arbitration hearings have not yet been completed (R.251),
but defendant made no objection to the Motion of Summary
JUdgment for payment of interest being heard prior to the
conclusion of the arbitration hearings.
The Arbitration Agreement provided that plaintiff's
claims be filed within 90 days.
of agreement provided:

However, the full context

(1) within 10 days all of the

surveys, original and final cross sections, contour designs,
cut volumes, mass haul diagrams, cross section rolls and
field notes on all of the projects would be examined and
copied;

(2) within 90 days plaintiff's claims would be

submitted;

(3) within 60 days after submission of plaintiff's

claims, defendant would submit its responses with full
documentary evidence and supporting data; and (4) within
60 days after filing of defendant's responses the arbitratioo

-14-
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board would hold its hearing and rule within 30 days
thereafter.

(R. 270-272).

None of these provisions were

adhered to.
The materials were too voluminous to examine and copy
within 10 days.

Plaintiff could not submit its claims

within 90 days.

Defendant's counsel reported to defendant

that on the Trachyte project alone extensive depositions
were taken along with several field inspection trips and
thorough investigation of documentation.

(R. 315).

Defendant could not submit its responses within 60 days.
(R. 249-250).

When submitted the responses did not

contain full documentation and supporting data.
326).

(R. 323-

The arbitration board could not hold its hearings

within 60 days after defendants response and rule within
30 days thereafter.

(R. 250).

All of the time requirements of the first five paragraphs of the Arbitration Agreement were waived by the
parties.

The arbitration hearings proceeded without

objection.
The' stipulations on the Brigham city claim and the
Hanksville claim bear the respective headings "Before the
Arbitration Board" and "Before the Arbitration Panel".

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

(R. 274, 277).

The letter evidencing the settlement of

the Trachyte claim bears the reference above the salutation "Re:

cox Arbitration".

(R. 315).

There is no

evidence that either of the stipulations or Mr. Strong's
letter were intended to supercede the Arbitration Agreement.

The record contains no evidence of any detriment

caused to defendant, and defendant did not present the
defense of estoppel to the District Court.

(R.

333-339).

It is uncontested that the amount of interest from
the due date to the date paid totals $21,532.24 for the
three claims.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THERE WAS NO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN
THE PARTIES ON THE DISPUTE INVOLVING PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM FOR INTEREST.
The law defining an accord and satisfaction is clear.
In Ralph A. Badger Co. v. Fidelity Building and LOan
Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669, the Utah Supreme
court said:

that:

"It is stated in 1 Am. JUr. p. 217, Sec. 4,
'The discharge of claims by way of accord
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and.sat~sfaction.is dependent upon a contract express
or implied; and it follows that the essentials
~ecessary to valid contracts generally must be present
in a contr~ct of accord and satisfaction. Therefore,
the .following elements are essential:
(1) a proper
subJect matter, (2) competent parties, (3) an assent
or meeting of the minds of the parties, and (4) a
consideration.'"
See also Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance society of
U.S., 94 Utah 532, 72 P. 2d 1060.
The law is well established that parties having
two or more matters in dispute may have an accord and
satisfaction as to one of the matters without affecting
the others.

In Blockhead, Inc., v. The Plastic Forming

company, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1017, D.c., D. conn., the
court said:
"Defendant submits that the settlement reached
in January and February of 1970 was a complete
accord and satisfaction with respect to all complaints
concerning the wiglet case and thus bars any recovery
by plaintiff. The court finds that the settlement
covered only specified defects and does not constitute
an accord with respect to unmentioned problems regardless of when they appeared.

* * * * *

"A settlement accepted with respect to injuries
that have already occurred will not constitute an
accord and satisfaction with respect to damages that
have not yet accrued.
(citing cases). Nor will a
settlement with respect to some issues of a dispute
constitute an accord and satisfaction of the other
issues not explicitly included within the settlement
provisions." (Emphasis added).
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Similarly, in Pierson v. Harrington, 138 Ga. App. 463,
226 S.E. 2d 299, the court said:
"An accord and satisfaction may be made between
the parties pro tanto ... the parties may make an
accord and satisfaction or what in law amounts to
an accord and satisfaction, as to one or more of
these demands without affecting the others.

*

*

*

*

*

" ••• Where there is no agreement to settle all
disputes arising from the contract a satisfaction
does not result, although money is demanded and
received."
Again, in Redman Development Corp. v. Pollard, 131 Ga.
App. 708, 206 S.E. 2d 605, it was held:
"The settlement of the extra work of $60,089.27
for $32,000 was in the nature of an accord and
satisfaction of this part of the contract when the
letter agreement and change order was signed by
the parties, although $3,200 was withheld pending
completion of the contract. However, this was not
an accord and satisfaction of the entire transaction
between the parties, but was limited to the items
going to make up the $60,089.27 above mentioned."
(Emphasis added).
Applying these rules to the facts of the instant
case it is apparent that there was no accord and satisfaction on plaintiff's claim to interest.

The only subject

matter of the stipulation and the agreement set forth in

Mr. Strong's letter was payment of principal amounts owed
for specific quantities of work performed by plaintiff under
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various contract items.

(R. 274-276, 277-281, 315-319).

The parties had a meeting of the minds only on payment
for such quantities of work which were payment of principal.
(R. 274-276, 277-281, 315-319).

Mr. strong said that

the subject of interest was not considered by the parties
in agreeing on the quantities of work to be paid for on
the Hanksville project and Trachyte project.

(R. 314).

Mr. Ford admitted that the question of interest was never
considered by the parties in negotiating and settling the
principal claims on the Brigham city project.

(R. 334).

In its Complaint in the District court plaintiff
demanded that defendant pay the principal amounts owing
and interest on such principal amounts.

There were two

matters in dispute between plaintiff and defendant:

first,

defendant's liability on the principal claims and, second,
defendant's liability to pay interest.

Under the Arbitra-

tion Agreement the first dispute, that of defendant's
liability to pay for the principal claims, was submitted
to the arbitration proceedings while the second dispute,
that of defendant's liability to pay interest, was reserved
as a question of law, for decision by the Third District
Court.

(R. 269-273).

An accord and satisfaction was
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reached as to the claims for principal payments.

However,

this accord and satisfaction as to the claims for payment
of principal does not act as an accord and satisfaction
on the second dispute, plaintiff's claim for payment of
interest.
The elements requiring an agreed subject matter and a
meeting of the minds set out in Ralph A. Badger co. v.
Fidelity Building and Loan Association, supra, and the
express rules stated in Pierson v. Harrington, supra;
Redman Development Corp. v. Pollard, supra; and Blockhead,
Inc., v. The Plastic Forming company, Inc., supra, support
the trial court's decision that there was no accord and
satisfaction as to plaintiff's claim for interest.

POINT II
THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO
INTEREST WAS A QUESTION OF LAW RESERVED FOR
DECISION BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
In its Complaint filed in the District court, plaintiff
demanded payment of interest.

The Arbitration Agreement in

Paragraph Eighth states, in part:
"Cox and Highway Department reserve all
questions of law to be heard by a District

-20-
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JUdge of the Third JUdicial District in and
for Salt Lake County as part of said suit,
Civil No. 177519. . . " (R. 2 72) .
It is well established that whether a party is entitled
to payment of interest is a question of law.

In

~

Lumber co., v. A. A. Clark Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 Pac.
764, a school board entered into a contract for the construetion of a building.

At the time the building was completed

the school board failed to make payment.

The trial court

refused to compel the school board to pay interest.

The

Utah Supreme court reversed that decision and required that
interest be paid at the legal rate from the date due until
paid.

The Court said:
" ... It is not a question of the school board
agreeing to pay interest either by warrant or otherwise. It is a guestion of its duty on one side and
the right of a creditor on the other. It is a right
that the statute gives to any one who has money due
and who is unable to collect the same. The school
board in this case accepted the building. Presumably
it had the use of it for the purpose for which it
was erected and had continued to use it since it was
accepted. Public policy, it seems to us, should
require a public corporation to meet its obligations
legally authorized whenever due, and upon failure to
do so that it be subjected to the same duty as
private individuals - to reimburse the creditor for
his forebearance or delay in receiving what is his
due." (Emphasis added).
In Uinta Pipeline corporation v. White Superior co.,
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546 P. 2d 885, the trial court refused to allow interest
prior to the date of judgment.

The Utah Supreme Court

reversed and ruled that pre-judgment interest should have
been allowed as a matter of law.

Recently this court

applied the rule to defendant herein in the case of Jack
B. Parson construction company v. State of Utah, 552 P.
2d 107, where the Utah State Road Commission was required
as a matter of law to pay pre-judgment interest on principal amounts found due under a highway construction contract,

POINT III
A.

THE CONTENTION THAT INTEREST SHOULD NOT

BE ALLOWED BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAD TRADITIONALLY
REFUSED TO PAY INTEREST IS WITHOUT MERIT.
B. THERE IS NO BASIS IN FACT OR LAW THAT WOULD
PERMIT TERMINATING INTEREST AS OF APRIL 29, 1971.
Defendant's second argument consists of two parts
which will be addressed separately.
A.

Defendant argues in its brief that:

"Respondent well knows that the State had traditionally not paid interest on claims of this nature.
Counsel for the parties had discussed this on numerous
occasions and the assertion of Appellant's counsel
that this was in fact the understanding of Respondent's
counsel is unchallenged."
(Appellant's Brief, page 8).
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From this statement defendant argues that since the state
traditionally had refused to pay interest at the time the
settlement agreements were entered into, it should not
have to pay interest now on the principal amounts that
were due and owing to plaintiff.
Defendant's argument fails to consider the facts of
this case relative to plaintiff's claim for interest and
the applicable law.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the District court in
which it demanded payment of the principal sums owing and
interest thereon.

The arbitration proceedings were

entered into to find the amount of principal owing to
plaintiff for work it had done.

The Arbitration Agreement

in paragraph Eighth specifically reserved all questions of
law for decision by the District Court.

The agreement

states:
"Cox and Highway Department reserve all questions
of law to be heard by a District JUdge of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County as
part of said suit, civil No. 177519 ••. "
(R. 272).
As demonstrated above in Point II, the question of plaintiff's
right to receive interest was a question of law.
Furthermore, both of defendant's counsel, Mr. Strong
and Mr. Ford, admitted that the subject of interest was
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never discussed or considered by the parties in the settlement negotiations.

(R.

314, 344).

In summary, the facts are that plaintiff made claim
for interest in the District Court action.

An Arbitration

Agreement was entered into to determine the principal
amounts owing and expressly reserved plaintiff's claim for
interest for decision by the District Court.

The settle-

ments of the claims for principal payment were entered
into, and in those negotiations the question of plaintiff's
right to interest was never considered.

Pursuant to the

Arbitration Agreement plaintiff submitted its claim for
interest as a question of law to the District Court.
The fact that defendant misapprehended the law cannot
affect plaintiff's legal right to interest.

Plaintiff

asserted that right from the outset, reserved it for
decision by the District court, did not settle its claim
for interest in settling the claims for principal, and
pursued its right to payment of interest in the District
Court.
The law is clear that the right to payment of interest
is a legal right which attaches upon the debtor's failure
to pay money when it is due and owing.

-24-

As noted in Baker
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Lumber Co. v. A. A. Clark co., supra:
"It is not a question of the school board
agreeing to pay interest either by warrant or otherwise.
It is a question of its duty on one side and
the right of a creditor on the other. It is a right
that the statute gives to any one who has money due
and who is unable to collect the same."
In Puget sound Pulp and Timber co. v. O'Reilly, 239 F. 2d
607, c.A. wash., the court said:
"Interest on money detained after it is due and
payable is recoverable as a matter of legal right."
As noted in Baker, supra, it is not a question of defendant
agreeing to pay interest, it is an obligation imposed by
law.
Under the facts and law the claim that defendant had
traditionally refused to pay interest cannot defeat
plaintiff's legal right to receive interest.
B. Defendant also argues in its second point that
interest should be terminated as of April 29, 1971, 90
days after the Arbitration Agreement was entered into,
because plaintiff had not filed its claims with the
arbitration board within that time.
There is no basis in fact, law or equity in this
position.

The interest attached to money defendant owed

to plaintiff.

Defendant had the obligation under section

1-9.1 and section 1-9.8 of the contract to accurately

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25-

measure the quantity of work done by plaintiff and to
pay plaintiff in full for that work.

(R. 264).

Defendant

could have paid plaintiff what it owed at any time and by
that payment terminated the interest.
Defendant's argument ignores other material and
relevant facts.

The first five paragraphs of the Arbitra-

tion Agreement contain time requirements.

(R.

270-272).

The first paragraph required that all original and final
surveys, original and final cross sections, cut volumes,
mass haul diagrams, cross section rolls and field notes
on nine highway construction projects be examined and copied
within 10 days.

This proved to be impossible because of

the sheer volume of material.

The second paragraph required

that plaintiff submit its claims in writing with full
documentation within 90 days after receipt of the documents
described in the first paragraph.

Plaintiff was unable to

submit its claims within the 90 day period, and defendant
made no objection.

The third paragraph required defendant

to submit its response in writing with full documentation
and supporting data within 60 days after receipt of
plaintiff's claims.
this provision.

Defendant was not able to comply with

(R. 249-250).

In fact, defendant's response
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on the Brigham City claim not only fails to contain full
documentation and supporting data, but even on eight contract
items on which it admitted it owed plaintiff money it had
not yet computed the amounts on five of those items and on
the other three admitted owing the full sum claimed by
plaintiff.

(R. 323-326).

This response was filed May

31, 1974 (R. 326), while the final estimate invoice had
been delivered October 5, 1967.

(R. 266).

On the five items

which it admitted it owed but hadn't determined the amount,
defendant had gone almost seven years without computing the
amounts it owed on contract items it admitted owing.

In

addition, defendant had gone seven years without paying
the other three items upon which it admitted owing the full
amount claimed by plaintiff.

The total amount owed on these

admitted items was $19,395.43.

(R. 274-276).

The fourth and fifth paragraphs require the arbitration
board to hold a hearing within 60 days after receipt of
defendant's response and render a decision within 30 days
after the hearing.
to.

These time requirements were not adhered

(R. 250).
None of the time requirements in the Arbitration

Agreement were adhered to and all were waived by the
parties.

No objection was made by either side at the time.
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The reason for the inability of all of the parties to meet
the time requirements of the agreement is set forth in

Mr. Strong's letter to defendant dated February 3, 1973.
This letter was written two years after the Arbitration
Agreement was entered into and contains no objection or
reference to any of the time provisions of the agreement.
The letter deals with only one of the nine contracts
subject to the Arbitration Agreement, and states with
reference to that one:
"Extensive depositions were taken on the project
which I have reported to you along with several
field inspection trips and an arbitration hearing
on three of the claims •••• However, the following
claims have been thoroughly investigated and reviewed by myself and the project engineer • • • "
(R. 315).
There is no legal, factual or equitable basis for terminating
interest at April 29, 1971.

As noted in the cases above,

interest runs from the time money is due until it is paid.

POINT IV
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS DO NOT
CREATE AN AMBIGUITY.

Defendant argues that the settlement agreements may
create an ambiguity as to whether they were intended to
settle plaintiff's claim for interest.

Defendant bases

this argument on the fact that the agreements fail to
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specifically refer to interest.
The Arbitration Agreement and settlement agreements
have been examined in some detail above.

As noted in

Big Butte Ranch, Inc., v. Marjorie R. Holm, et al, case
No. 14630, this court stated:
" • • • to ascertain the meaning of the agreement
the court should first examine the language of the
instruments and accord to it the weight and effect
which it may show was intended •
"
There is no ambiguity in the language of the agreements.
Plaintiff had demanded payment of principal amounts owed
and interest thereon in its complaint in District court.
The Arbitration Agreement was entered into to resolve
plaintiff's claim for principal amounts owing under the
contracts, and as quoted above, in paragraph Eighth the
parties specifically reserved all question of law for
decision by the District court.

(R. 272).

Plaintiff's

right to payment of interest was a question of law so
reserved and was never involved in the arbitration proceedings.
Defendant's two attorneys both stated that interest was
never considered by the parties in negotiating the settlements.
(R. 314, 344).
The settlement agreements were entered into pursuant to
the Arbitration Agreement and as part of the arbitration
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proceedings.

The two stipulations bear the respective

headings "Before the Arbitration Panel"
"Before the Arbitration Board".

(R. 277) and

(R. 274).

The letter

reflecting the agreement on the Trachyte project bears the
reference above the salutation "Re:
(R. 315).

cox Arbitration".

The content of this letter is nearly identical

in substance with the content of the two stipulations and,
contrary to the statement in defendant's brief, this
letter was drafted by Mr. Strong, an attorney for defendant.
The settlement agreements are very specific with
reference to exactly what they settle between the parties.
For example, on two typical items the Brigham City stipulation states:
"EXCAVATION FOR STRUCTURES, UNCLASSIFIED
"Disposition

Amount of Payment

"Defendant will pay for an
additional 467.95 cubic
yards at the contract
unit price of $3.00 per
yard.

$1,403.85

SPREADING TOPSOIL
"Disposition

Amount of Payment

"Defendant will pay for an
additional 2,298.67 cubic
yards at the contract unit
price of 75 cents per cubic
yard.
(R. 274-275).

$1, 724.00"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-30-

Every single item for which defendant paid under the three
settlement agreements was set forth in the same kind of
detail.

(R.

274-276; 277-281; 315-319).

Each item paid for in the settlement agreements
represented a specific quantity of work done by plaintiff
under the respective contracts and represented principal
payments due to plaintiff.

Defendant quotes a cover letter

on the Brigham City stipulation which states:
"I believe the enclosed stipulation sets forth
our settlement on the Brigham City claim • . • • (R. 327).
The stipulation which was enclosed clearly was a settlement
of plaintiff's principal claims on the contract items set
forth in the stipulation.

(R. 274-276).

As noted above,

plaintiff's claim for interest had been reserved for
decision by the Third District court.
The proceedings were carried out exactly as contemplated
by the Arbitration Agreement.

The settlements of the

principal claims were made in the arbitration proceedings
and plaintiff's claim for interest was decided by the District
Court.
POINT V
THE THREE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WERE ENTERED
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INTO AS PART OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS AND
DID NOT SUPERCEDE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.
The three settlement agreements were entered into as
part of the arbitration proceedings.

As noted above, the

stipulation on the Brigham City project bore the heading
"Before the Arbitration Board"

(R. 274): the stipulation

on the Hanksville project had the caption "Before the
Arbitration Panel"

(R. 277); and the letter evidencing the

agreement on the Trachyte project had the reference "Re:
cox Arbitration".

(R. 315).

Since the settlement agreements were specifically part
of the arbitration proceedings there is no factual or legal
basis for defendant's claim that the Arbitration Agreement
was superceded.

POINT VI
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT ITS CLAIM OF
ESTOPPEL TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND IS THEREFORE
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE QUESTION ON APPEAL.
Defendant failed to present its claim of estoppel
to the District court.

(R. 333-339).

Utah law provides

that a party cannot present a claim or defense on appeal
to the Supreme Court which has not first been presented to
the trial court for its decision.

In the case of

~
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Jones' Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P. 2d 210, the court said:
"Administratrix raises for the first time in
her appeal the Statute of Limitation and laches as
defenses against the tax. The Statute of Limitation
and laches are affirmative defenses which must be
pleaded.
(citing cases). It appears that these
defenses were never raised in the district court nor
even referred to in the assignment of error. They
cannot now be raised on appeal."
Estoppel is a defense which must be pleaded.
Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P. 2d 730.

Collett v.

In Mathis v. Madsen,

1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P. 2d 952, the defense of res judicata
was presented for the first time on appeal.

The court

refused to consider the defense and said:
" ••• nor is it our perogative to determine
the question of res judicata before it is presented
to a lower court."
Similarly, in Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P. 2d
465, the court refused to consider the defense of illegality
of a contract which was not raised in the trial court.
The question of estoppel is not properly before the
court on this appeal and Point v of defendant's brief
should be disregarded.
POINT VII
PLAINTIFF rs NOT ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
ITS CLAIM FOR INTEREST.

-33-
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Plaintiff is not estopped from asserting its claim for
interest herein.

Plaintiff followed the express provisions

of the arbitration proceedings in presenting its claim for
interest on these projects.

Claim was made for payment of

interest in the Complaint in the District court.

In the

Arbitration Agreement the decision on the claim for interest
was reserved to the District Court.

As to the timing of

the submission of the claim for interest to the District
court, paragraph Eighth of the Arbitration Agreement
provided:
" • • Said question of law shall be heard by
said judge following the arbitration hearings."
(R.

272).

The arbitration hearings are not yet complete.

(R. 251).

Defendant could have argued in District court that plaintiff's
motion for the award of interest was premature, but it failed
to do so.
The fundamental element of estoppel is detriment or
injury to the party claiming the estoppel.

Easton v. Wycoff,

4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P. 2d 332; Miglii:lccio v. Davis, 120 Utah
1, 232 P. 2d 195; and cook v. cook, 110 Utah 406, 174 P. 2d
434.

There is no evidence of any injury or detriment to

defendant arising from plaintiff's claiming interest.

The

money paid to plaintiff was admitted by defendant's counsel
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to be solely for principal amounts due and owing under
the contract which defendant was liable to pay.
rt is difficult to understand defendant's claim of
estoppel against plaintiff's claim for interest.
is based upon equity.

Estoppel

The record shows that on the Brigham

city project alone defendant withheld from plaintiff the
principal sum of $19,395.43, which it admitted from the
outset is owed plaintiff for a period of nearly seven years.
(R. 274-276, 323-326).

Defendant cannot claim the protec-

tion of equity against paying interest on this sum.
There is no factual or legal basis for the defense
that plaintiff is estopped from asserting its claim for
interest.
CONCLUSION

rt is respectfully submitted that the Partial summary
JUdgment entered by the District court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

John F. Piercey
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that two copies of the foregoing Respondent's
Brief were served by mailing, postage prepaid, to Leland
Ford, attorney for Appellant, Attorney General's Office,
115 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

~~~~~day

of January, 1978.

John F. Piercey
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